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“CORRUPTLY” CONTINUES CONSISTENTLY CONFOUNDING COURTS: 
A NEW LOOK AT “CORRUPTLY PERSUADES” IN 18 U.S.C. § 1512(B) 





The word “corruptly” presents significant interpretation problems to 
courts construing the word in statutes. This word has created a circuit split 
between the Second and Third Circuits over 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), which 
forbids corruptly persuading witnesses not to cooperate with federal 
authorities. The Second Circuit requires defendants to have an improper 
purpose for persuading a witness not to cooperate. The Third Circuit 
requires defendants to know they have a corrupt motive behind their 
persuasion. Rather than declare one approach superior to the other, this 
Note instead contends that both Circuits achieve the same outcome for two 
reasons. First, both circuits rely on equivalent connotations for 
interpreting “corruptly.” Second, both circuits recognize that some 
motives for persuading a witness are not corrupt, and thus should not be 
prosecuted under § 1512(b). Even though the Third Circuit better clarifies 
that persuasion undertaken for innocent purposes should not be 
prosecuted, this Note demonstrates that the circuit split over § 1512(b) is 
not as drastic as other analyses claim.   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Obstruction of justice has received much media coverage, thanks to former 
Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III’s high-profile investigation into both Russian 
interference in the 2016 United States presidential election and former President 
Donald Trump’s potentially obstructive efforts to hinder the investigation.1 While 
Mueller declined to issue obstruction of justice charges against Trump,2 the renewed 
 
* © 2021 Connor Nelson. J.D. Candidate, May 2021, S.J. Quinney College of Law, 
University of Utah. The author wishes to thank Professors Paul Cassel, Clifford Rosky, and 
Matthew Tokson for their valued feedback, as well as the Utah Law Review editors and staff 
for their diligent work editing this Note. All my thanks to my family for their love and 
support.   
1 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2, VOL. II OF II, 2019 WL 1780146 
(2019) [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT] (probing some of Trump’s actions in the first half of 
his term for potential obstruction of the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 
presidential election). 
2 Id. at *144. A lengthy explanation of the reasons why Mueller chose not to issue any 
indictments against Trump is beyond the scope of this Note and will not be discussed herein. 
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popular discussion of obstruction of justice that his investigation produced gives 
ample opportunity to reconsider the mechanics of this particular crime. Key among 
them are what characteristics establish a corrupt motive and how they should apply 
in prosecutions. 
Most important is whether the person performing the obstructive acts possessed 
the requisite intent for an obstruction of justice charge.3 The act of obstructing a 
federal proceeding can be achieved inadvertently.4 Discussion on the importance of 
motive matters because the law demands careful consideration of a defendant’s 
intent behind the alleged obstructive actions.5 Determining when a defendant’s 
obstruction is performed with the requisite intent for criminal liability is a problem 
in obstruction of justice prosecution across federal courts.6 
18 U.S.C. § 1512 criminalizes witness tampering by “corruptly persuad[ing]” 
another with the intent to cause the other to “withhold testimony,” “alter, destroy, 
mutilate, or conceal” evidence to make that evidence unavailable, “evade legal 
process summoning,” and to “be absent from an official proceeding” after receiving 
a summons.7 Two major lines of interpreting “corruptly” within this statute exist.8 
First, the Second Circuit describes “corruptly” as an “improper purpose.”9 In United 
States v. Thompson,10 the court held that “corruptly” meant a defendant was 
“motivated by an improper purpose.”11 Second, the Third Circuit demands 
knowledge of a corrupt purpose for the alleged behavior, or corruption as a specific 
intent.12 In United States v. Farrell,13 the court held that persuasion could occur 
“with the intent of hindering an investigation . . . [but] without doing so 
‘corruptly.’”14 This split has expanded to several other circuits. In their respective 
 
However, the particular circumstances and consequences for presidential obstruction of 
justice pose important constitutional and criminal law questions for in-depth scholarly study. 
For more detailed analysis of these questions, see generally Daniel J. Hemel & Eric A. 
Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2018). 
3 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 1, at *11; Sarah Grant, Sabrina McCubbin, Yisahi 
Schwartz, & Benjamin Wittes, Donald Trump, Paul Manafort and that Pesky Witness 
Tampering Statute, LAWFARE (Aug. 23, 2018, 6:55 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
donald-trump-paul-manafort-and-pesky-witness-tampering-statute [https://perma.cc/8BTL-
FMUW]. 
4 See Grant et al., supra note 3. 
5 See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 1, at *14. 
6 Diane A. Shrewsbury, Comment, Degrees of Corruption: The Current State of 
“Corrupt Persuasion” in 18 USC Sec. 1512, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 375, 375 (2012). 
7 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). 
8 Grant et al., supra note 3; 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) was one of the statutes reviewed in the 
final report as one source for possible criminal liability. MUELLER REPORT, supra note 1, at 
*14. 
9 Grant et al., supra note 3. 
10 76 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1996).  
11 Id. at 452. 
12 Grant et al., supra note 3. 
13 126 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1997). 
14 Id. at 489. 
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reviews of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), the Eleventh Circuit generally adopted the Second 
Circuit formulation,15 and the Ninth Circuit expressly chose the Third Circuit 
formulation.16 
Despite the different phrasing between them, this Note argues that the circuits’ 
understandings of “corruptly” in “corruptly persuades” are not at odds, but that they 
achieve the same practical effect. This reading is true for two reasons. First, both 
circuits identify similar connotations, such as wrongful and immoral, as acceptable 
bases for satisfying “corruptly.” Second, both the “improper purpose” standard and 
the “knowledge of a corrupt purpose” standard as implemented recognize that some 
purposes for persuasion are not corrupt, and are therefore exempt from prosecution. 
The purpose of this Note is not to argue that one formulation of “corruptly 
persuades” is superior to the other. Instead, this Note aims to show that both circuits 
recognize and review § 1512(b) witness tampering obstruction of justice under 
similar guiding principles to achieve similar results. 
Part II gives background and commentary on “corruptly” in United States 
federal criminal law and for “corruptly persuades” in § 1512(b). The background 
will draw on three sources: (1) legislative history and Congressional intent for 18 
U.S.C. § 1512(b), (2) the federal criminal justice systems’ consideration of what 
“corruptly” means and the difficulties courts have had establishing a consistent 
theoretical meaning, and (3) the Supreme Court’s most recent consideration of 
§ 1512(b) in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States.17 Part III reviews the Second 
and Third Circuit’s precedential cases for § 1512(b) prosecution, including how each 
reasoned what “corruptly” means in “corruptly persuades” and how the reasons 
given applied to each case. Part IV compares the two circuits’ formulations for 
similarities to Arthur Andersen LLP and each other. Even though the United States 
Supreme Court decided Arthur Andersen LLP in 2005, after the Second Circuit 
decided Thompson in 1996 and the Third Circuit decided Farrell in 1997, both 
circuits have carried their respective analyses through to their more recent cases. A 
comparison of their approaches will demonstrate that both circuits capture and apply 
“corruptly” appropriately under Arthur Andersen LLP. 
  
 
15 United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1299–1302 (11th Cir. 1998); Shrewsbury, 
supra note 6, at 381–88 (examining the circuit split over interpreting “corruptly” between 
the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). But see United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 
1278, 1299–1301 (11th Cir. 2019) (upholding an 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) conviction based 
on jury’s reasonable determination based on the evidence, but without mentioning the 
“improper purpose” standard). 
16 United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181, 1187–89 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Johnson, 874 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2017) (reviewing convictions for a variety of counts 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1512, including § 1512(b)); Shrewsbury, supra note 6, at 381–88. 
17 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
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II.  BACKGROUND: ARTICULATING CONCEPTS FOR “CORRUPTLY” IN 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(B) 
 
When statutory construction using the plain meaning of words produces unclear 
interpretations, courts must look to additional sources to define statutory language.18 
As discussed below, “corruptly” is one such word troubling courts in interpreting 
many criminal law statutes, including § 1512(b).19 For an illustration of this issue, 
this Note overviews § 1512(b)’s legislative history, lower court attempts to grapple 
with and interpret “corruptly,” and the Supreme Court’s determinations for 
§ 1512(b) set forth in Arthur Andersen LLP. 
 
A.  18 U.S.C § 1512(b): General Construction and Legislative Insights 
 
Obstruction of justice charges in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 et. seq. punish conduct 
preventing the “due administration of justice.”20 Acts potentially warranting a 
witness tampering charge include witness intimidation, false testimony, and 
compromising the integrity of individuals involved in judicial proceedings.21 
Introduced as part of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982,22 and 
prosecuted as obstruction of justice, subsections of § 1512 criminalize killing 
witnesses,23 “corruptly persuad[ing]” witnesses,24 destroying documents,25 and 
otherwise interfering with judicial processes.26 As Congress intended, § 1512(b) is 
the most commonly used statute for prosecuting witness tampering activity.27 The 
troubling phrase “corruptly persuades” entered § 1512(b) with amendments adopted 
in 1988.28 
 
18 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) 
(elaborating on how courts ought to interpret statutes). 
19 Eric J. Tamashasky, The Lewis Carroll Offense: The Ever-Changing Meaning of 
“Corruptly” within the Federal Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGIS. 129, 130–32 (2005); see 
Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1917). 
20 18 U.S.C. § 1503. 
21 See John F. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American 
Criminal Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 49, 61–65 (2004). 
22 Mark Hsen, Nicholas Evert, Rien Susca, & Bailey Wendzel, Obstruction of Justice, 
55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1497, 1518 (2018); see generally Victim and Witness Protection Act 
of 1982, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–1515 (2012) (enacting the new obstruction of justice statutes). 
23 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a). 
24 Id. § 1512(b). 
25 Id. § 1512(c)(1). 
26 Id. § 1512(d). 
27 Decker, supra note 21, at 72. 
28 United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2011); see generally Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, § 7029(c), 102 Stat. 4181, 4398 (1988) (expanding 
18 U.S.C. § 1512 by adding new obstruction of justice amendments). 
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Before the enactment of § 1512, witness tampering prosecutions fell under 18 
U.S.C. § 1503,29 along with many other obstructive acts.30 However, this statute did 
not offer the best source for witness tampering charges because defendants had to 
commit a greater number of serious acts to face criminal liability.31 Recognizing the 
burdens of a § 1503 charge for witness tampering, Congress enacted § 1512 to 
provide federal prosecutors a section specifically designed for prosecuting witness 
tampering.32 Section 1512 first expanded the types of individuals classified as 
witnesses to cover more people than just those called by subpoena in an active 
proceeding.33 The change intended to extend the witness tampering charge to 
persuasive conduct directed towards persons not called to testify at trial.34 Section 
1512 also removed the “threshold requirements” for a § 1503 charge applied to 
witness tampering: an intent to influence a witness, under subpoena, in an active 
criminal prosecution.35 This new statute provided two possible opportunities to 
prosecute criminal persuasion that were not allowed under § 1503: persuasion of 
witnesses a defendant did not expect to testify, and persuasion that occurred before 
a judicial proceeding commenced.36 
Legislative history provides few additional insights for implementing 
“corruptly.” Information provided to the Senate during its consideration of the 1988 
bill offers this clarification: by “corrupt persuasion,” the bill intended to apply to 
any “non-coercive attempt to induce a witness to become unavailable to testify, or 
to testify falsely.”37 The report also shows that Congress intended to strengthen 
§ 1512(b) to cover a greater range of coercive behavior than the 1982 enactment 
allowed.38 The amendment intended to “include in section 1512 the same protection 
of witnesses from non-coercive influence that was (and is) found in section 1503.”39 
The idea behind “corruptly persuades” was to exempt certain behaviors from 
prosecution under § 1512 the same as § 1503 presently did.40 However, the report 
 
29 Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal Witness 
Tampering Statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(b), 185 A.L.R. Fed. 1, 2b (2003); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503 (providing the general obstruction of justice statute, applicable to influencing or 
injuring jurors and court officials. Before § 1512 was enacted in 1982, § 1503 also applied 
to witness tampering).  
30 Brian M. Haney, Contrasting the Prosecution of Witness Tampering Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 1512: Why § 1512 Better Serves the Government at Trial, 9 SUFFOLK 
J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 57, 61–62 (2004). 
31 Id. at 63. 
32 Id. at 62–64. 
33 S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 14–15 (1982). 
34 Haney, supra note 30, at 62–63.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 63. 
37 Shrewsbury, supra note 6, at 378–79 (citing The Minor and Technical Criminal Law 
Amendments Acts of 1988, HR 5210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., in 134 Cong. Rec. S. 7446–01, 
7447 (daily ed. June 8, 1988)). 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 379, n.16 (citing 134 Cong. Rec. S., at 7447).  
40 Id. at 379. 
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did not discuss what Congress meant by “corruptly,” or what purposes would satisfy 
any definition. 
The elements of a § 1512(b) prosecution are straightforward. The prosecution 
must prove a defendant: “(1) knowingly (2) engaged in intimidation, physical force, 
threats, misleading conduct, or corrupt persuasion toward another person (3) with 
intent to influence, delay, or prevent testimony or cause any person to withhold a 
record, object, document, or testimony (4) from an official proceeding.”41 
Intimidation, threats, misleading conduct, or anything else that corruptly persuades 
a witness is enough to cause criminal liability.42 The prosecution must show a 
“pending judicial proceeding” (or that a proceeding is occurring or soon will occur, 
though it need not occur when the persuasion happened),43 the defendant’s 
“knowledge of the proceeding,” and actions which show the defendant “corruptly 
endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice.”44 
Framing obstruction of justice around a pending or ongoing judicial proceeding 
limits potential obstructive acts to times when a federal authority is or soon will 
administer justice.45 
Section 1512(e) offers an affirmative defense to all § 1512 charges. To use this 
defense successfully, the defendant must show the alleged “conduct consisted solely 
of lawful conduct and that the defendant’s sole intention was to encourage, induce, 
or cause the other person to testify truthfully.”46 This defense acknowledges a 
difference between culpable and innocent purposes for persuasion.47 Recognizing 
that innocent persuasive acts are permissible underlies the Supreme Court’s analysis 
of § 1512(b) in Arthur Andersen LLP.48 The purpose for this defense, granting an 
exception from liability for innocent acts of persuasion, parallels the circuit split 
discussed in this Note. However, the “improper purpose” standard does not 
expressly exclude innocent persuasive acts from prosecution, causing confusion in 
its application.49 
 
B.  “Corruptly”: A Confounding Term in the United States Criminal Code 
 
Deciding what purposes are corrupt and punishable is an issue that has long 
plagued United States judicial systems. While courts may consider obstructive acts 
 
41 Hsen et al., supra note 22, at 1520.  
42 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b); Sean Lavin, Julia Bell, MaeAnn Dunker, & Mitchell McBride, 
Obstruction of Justice, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201, 1225–26 (2019). 
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). 
44 Decker, supra note 21, at 54.  
45 Lavin et al., supra note 42, at 1228. 
46 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e); Decker, supra note 21, at 72. 
47 See Steven F. Smith, “Innocence” and the Guilty Mind, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1610, 1619 
(2018). 
48 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703–04 (2005). 
49 See Shrewsbury, supra note 6, at 388 (applying the “improper purpose” standard to 
hypothetical situations involving innocent persuasive acts); Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 
706. 
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inherently corrupt,50 and construe bribery or attempts to falsify testimony as 
corrupt,51 they do not uniformly apply “corruptly” as a mens rea term in United 
States federal criminal law.52 Such inconsistent definitions pose problems for 
establishing a consistent criminal culpability for “corruptly” regardless of how it 
appears in the United States Code.53 It is unhelpful that “corruptly” can take many 
meanings, further complicating how courts should read this word.54 
There are some exceptions to this general trend. One example appears outside 
the obstruction of justice context, where “corruptly” means acting with an “intent to 
secure an unlawful advantage or benefit” under 28 U.S.C. § 7212(a), for certain 
I.R.S. investigations.55 Under this definition, the prosecution can focus either on 
obtaining unlawful benefits or interfering with the administration of justice.56 
Uniformly applied definitions like in 28 U.S.C. § 7212(a) cases give greater 
consistency and certainty to the term’s effect in any jurisdiction, a quality lacking in 
other obstruction of justice contexts. 
Different obstruction of justice statutes in 18 U.S.C. § 1500 et. seq apply 
“corruptly” inconsistently.57 The “improper purpose” language of the Second 
Circuit, or its near equivalent, “evil intent,” also appears in some circuits’ 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503 analyses, while others elect to use the even more recursive phrasing, “with 
intent to obstruct justice.”58 For example, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1505,59 
the D.C. Circuit analyzed “corruptly” in great detail.60 The Poindexter court 
determined that corrupt intent was “the intent to obtain an improper advantage for 
[one]self or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others,” 
 
50 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 617 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (claiming acts that defendants intend to obstruct justice are “wrongful” 
and therefore “corrupt.”). 
51 Surette, supra note 29, at 2a. 
52 See Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 130–32.  
53 Id. at 130, n.7. Multiple organizations, including the National Commission on 
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws and the American Law Institute criticize using “corruptly” 
as a standard of culpable conduct and suggest alternative, more specific language be used 
instead. Id. at n.7.  
54 Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1917); see also Corruption, 
BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 264 (Compact ed. 2011) (“Corruption is, in general, the 
degradation of something once pure, noble, or correct. In law, it is the failure to use a legal 
power in the manner and for the purpose it was invested in its holder.”). 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1985). 
56 See Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 148–49. 
57 See id. at 129–31; see also United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
58 Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 150–57. 
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (applying to obstruction of federal agency or department 
proceedings).  
60 See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 378. (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting 
“corruptly” means “depraved, evil: perverted into a state of moral weakness or wickedness” 
(quoting United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881–82 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Silberman, J., 
concurring in part)). 
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but that the word “corrupt” was defined vaguely.61 The court’s review of legislative 
intent determined that for § 1505’s “corruptly” to apply, “obstruction . . . of justice 
cannot be fully carried out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted 
obstruction offenses. There must also be protection against the rare type of conduct 
that is the product of an inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice.”62 
Based on its analysis, the D.C. Circuit found that this standard did not describe 
Poindexter’s conduct.63 
Seemingly specific yet effectively imprecise language similar to “corruptly 
persuades” appears in many statutes, which has posed difficulties in interpretation 
to lawyers and judges alike.64 Language such as “corruptly” is difficult to interpret 
because of how broadly some verbs and adverbs apply to specific contexts.65 
Problems applying the proper meaning of “corruptly” are further compounded 
because the proper context for the best definition “exist[s] in case-by-case 
settings.”66 If applications of “corrupt” require some degree of individual case 
review, prosecutors and courts have greater latitude determining what acts are 
corrupt and open to prosecution.67 But case-by-case review does not and should not 
prevent federal courts from recognizing a uniform application for “corruptly” in 
§ 1512(b) and elsewhere. The example of 28 U.S.C. § 7212(a) demonstrates courts 
can apply a uniform definition without issue.68 
 
C.  Supreme Court Precedent: Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States 
 
The most recent Supreme Court case to discuss “corruptly” § 1512(b) at length 
occurred in 2005, in Arthur Andersen LLP. In this case, the accounting firm Arthur 
Andersen LLP faced scrutiny for its accounting of Enron Corporation’s finances.69 
 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 382. 
63 Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 161; see also Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 378–79 (holding 
“corruptly” in § 1505 “is too vague to provide constitutionally adequate notice that it 
prohibits lying to the Congress”).  
64 See Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 130–32.  
65 See id. This problem plagues many areas of the law, but is essential in criminal law 
given the nature of acts prosecuted and the consequences for those convicted. The necessary 
inquiry of criminal prosecution entails establishing which sorts of conduct rise to the vague 
standard described in the pertinent statute, which do not, and if the alleged facts before the 
court belongs in the former or latter category. Professor Jill C. Anderson notes that 
considering a statute’s overall sentence structure may provide an answer to the problem of 
seemingly conflicting interpretations. Jill C. Anderson, Misreading Like a Lawyer: Cognitive 
Bias in Statutory Interpretation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (2014) (discussing imprecise 
language and the statutory interpretation difficulties it poses). The sentence in a statutory 
provision may mean something different than would one word analyzed out of context. Id.  
66 Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 132. 
67 See id. 
68 Id. at 141. 
69 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698–702 (2005). 
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When the Enron scandal broke in 2001,70 Arthur Andersen LLP faced obstruction 
of justice charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B) for shredding documents 
related to Enron under its internal document shredding policy, but also under 
potentially dubious circumstances.71 The accounting firm was convicted at trial and 
appealed.72 The Supreme Court’s reversal did not save Arthur Andersen LLP,73 and 
other developments changed how § 1512(b) relates to the document shredding and 
destruction of evidence contexts.74 However, the case contributes to this Note’s 
discussion of § 1512(b) because the Court used this case to consider how “corruptly” 
should apply in “corruptly persuades.” 
The Supreme Court began by noting how “corruptly” in § 1512(b)’s “corruptly 
persuades” was “key to what may or may not lawfully be done.”75 Properly 
describing and applying “corruptly” in § 1512(b) was therefore an important issue.76 
The Court first noted that persuasion intending to cause another “to ‘withhold’ 
testimony or documents from a Government proceeding or Government official is 
not inherently malign.”77 For example, telling another person of her guaranteed 
Constitutional rights during a criminal investigation or giving privileged legal advice 
as an attorney are not necessarily corrupt acts, even though they could obstruct a 
government inquiry.78 Instead, because “corruptly” modifies “persuades,” a 
defendant must have a purpose beyond impeding the proceeding, which must be a 
 
70 Enron Corp. was one of the largest energy trading companies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Alex Berenson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Rival to Buy Enron, Top Energy Trader, After 
Financial Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/10/business 
/rival-to-buy-enron-top-energy-trader-after-financial-fall.html [https://perma.cc/2WBW-
MP8J]. However, much of its profits in the late 1990s were attributable to misleading 
accounting practices and offloading debts to offshore partnership companies. Enron Fast 
Facts, CNN (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/us/enron-fast-
facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/QN26-682B]. Finally, in October 2001, after concerns 
about the company’s finances become public, the SEC investigated the company, the results 
of which in turn led to Enron’s demise in 2002. Id. Arthur Andersen began shredding 
documents related to Enron in October 2001 as well. Id.  
71 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 699–702.  
72 Id. at 702. 
73 The Enron scandal severely damaged Arthur Andersen LLP’s reputation. Despite a 
favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, Arthur Andersen LLP still went out of business in 
the scandal’s wake. John Hasnas, The Significant Meaninglessness of Arthur Andersen LLP 
v. United States, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 187, 187–89 (2004). 
74 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 introduced 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) and § 1519, while 
the Arthur Andersen LLP prosecution proceeded in the courts. Id. at 193–94; see generally 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c), 1519 (criminalizing document destruction, alteration, or falsification 
with the intent to obstruct official proceedings). 
75 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 704. 
76 Id. at 706. 
77 Id. at 703–04. 
78 Id. at 704; see also Hasnas, supra note 73, at n.34 (contemplating that Arthur 
Andersen LLP may prove significant for future § 1512(b) prosecutions, but instead 
postulating the new, stricter, and uninterpreted statute § 1512(c) would replace § 1512(b) as 
a favorite provision for obstruction of justice prosecutions). 
488 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
corrupt purpose.79 The Court further determined, “Only persons conscious of 
wrongdoing can be said to ‘knowingly . . . corruptly persuade.’”80 These examples 
recognize that persuasion can occur without a corrupt intent, or that some persuasive 
efforts are beyond § 1512(b)’s reach. The Supreme Court’s emphasis on this 
distinction defers to the defendant’s state of mind.81 
The Supreme Court issued no controlling definition for “corruptly” as used in 
§ 1512(b). Instead, the Court held that the jury instruction defining “corruptly,” 
using “subvert, undermine, or impede,” harmed Arthur Andersen LLP at trial 
because the conventional definitions of each word encompass acts the Court 
described as innocent.82 To frame its discussion of the qualifying term “corruptly,” 
the opinion only mentions synonyms for “corruptly,” which were its ordinary 
associations with words such as “wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil.”83 These 
connotations describe what sorts of intent a defendant ought to have to face liability 
under § 1512(b), namely intents that are not innocent. The connotations recognize 
the difference between the intents of persuasion the Supreme Court thought should 
not be prosecutable under § 1512(b), like informing another of Constitutional rights 
or giving privileged advice as an attorney, and prosecutable types of persuasion.84 
Though they are not a controlling definition, these connotations are useful in 
establishing a conceptual framework for what each court—the Supreme Court, the 
Second Circuit, and the Third Circuit—means by “corruptly.” 
The Supreme Court’s general observations parallel scholarly commentary of 
inconsistent definitions of “corrupt” across federal criminal law.85 While the Arthur 
Andersen LLP ruling had little consequence in changing the accounting firm’s fate,86 




79 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 707. 
80 Id. at 706.  
81 Smith, supra note 47, at 1614. 
82 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 706–08 (determining that the verbs subvert, 
undermine, and impede and similar “connotations do not incorporate any ‘corrupt[ness]’ at 
all.”). 
83 Id. at 705. The Supreme Court relied on several different dictionaries in searching 
for a proper meaning for “corrupt.” See Corrupt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 371 (8th ed. 
2004); Corrupt, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 512 (1993); Corrupt, 
WILLIAM MORRIS, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
299–300 (1981).  
84 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 704. 
85 See Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 130–31. 
86 Arthur Andersen LLP’s involvement in the Enron scandal severely damaged its 
reputation. Despite a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, Arthur Andersen LLP still 
closed in the Enron scandal’s wake. Hasnas, supra note 73, at 187–89. 
87 Id. at 189.  
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III.  CIRCUIT COURT CONSIDERATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. § 1512(B) 
 
In the wake of Arthur Andersen LLP, the Second Circuit has made some 
changes to its framework for interpreting “corruptly persuades” as an “improper 
purpose.”88 One recent case began moving away from the “improper purpose” 
articulation.89 The Third Circuit by contrast has not needed to alter is approach 
because Arthur Andersen LLP’s holding traced its general reasoning.90 Due to this 
state of affairs, this Note analyzes the key cases reviewing “corruptly” in both 
circuits.91 The present circuit split hinges on explicitly recognizing what purposes 
surpass innocent persuasion, as the Supreme Court recognized it in Arthur Andersen 
LLP.92 
 
A.  The Second Circuit Approach: United States v. Thompson 
 
Everett Thompson participated in a marijuana distribution conspiracy by 
purchasing from a local distributor for resale.93 After becoming aware of a federal 
 
88 See, e.g., United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 343 (2d Cir. 2006) (restating “corrupt 
persuasion” in § 1512(b) as “motivated by an improper purpose” (quoting United States v. 
Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996))); United States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 372 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (affirming a § 1512(b) conviction); United States v. Veliz, 800 F.3d 63, 70 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (observing again that “‘corrupt persuasion’ under 18 U.S.C.S. § 1512(b)” has been 
defined “to mean persuasion ‘motivated by an improper purpose’” (quoting Thompson, 76 
F.3d at 452)); United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 299 (2d. Cir. 2018); cf. United States 
v. McLaurin, 767 F. App’x 186, 187 (2d Cir. 2019) (upholding a § 1512(b) conviction and 
discussing 1512(b)(3) as “knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades 
another person” (citing 18 U.S.C.S. § 1512(b)(3))).  
89 McLaurin actually goes farther towards recognizing the knowing of a corrupt purpose 
standard from Arthur Andersen LLP than previous Second Circuit cases, farther than some 
of the “improper purpose” line of cases discussed herein. “[I]mproper purpose” does not 
appear in the McLaurin opinion, but “specific intent” does. McLaurin, 767 F. App’x at 187 
(citing United States v. Genao, 343 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Even though the analysis here argues there is no effective distinction between 
“improper purpose” and the knowing of a corrupt purpose standard, this case reinforces the 
Second Circuit’s recognition that a defendant ought to know of his corrupt purpose to support 
a § 1512(b) prosecution. Id. Future developments in the Second Circuit on this point should 
prove illuminating. 
90 See, e.g., United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 379 (3d Cir. 2012) (remanding a 
§ 1512(b)(1) case under the judicial proceeding element, without much discussion of corrupt 
persuasion); United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2013) (remanding a § 1512(b) 
case under the judicial proceeding element, without much discussion of corrupt persuasion); 
United States v. Williams, 666 F. App’x 186, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing the 
applicability of the affirmative defense in § 1512(e) based in innocent purposes persuasion 
and concluding the District Court did not need to raise awareness of William’s defense in 
jury instructions). 
91 See Shrewsbury, supra note 6, at 381–88. 
92 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005). 
93 United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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grand jury investigation into the distributor’s activities, Thompson pressured a 
witness, another buyer, to tell the grand jury that Thompson bought less marijuana 
from the distributor than he actually had.94 Thompson was charged with involvement 
in this conspiracy, a related tax fraud conspiracy, and for witness tampering under 
§ 1512(b)(1).95 Thompson challenged many aspects of his trial, including 
§ 1512(b)’s constitutionality.96 
The Thompson court first established the constitutionality of § 1512(b) because 
it permitted speech protected under the First Amendment.97 Thompson had asserted 
that § 1512(b) “broadly ‘proscrib[ed] persuasion’” of any kind.98 The first step in 
the Court’s response to Thompson’s argument involved laying grounds for the 
challenged use of “corruptly.” The Court relied on its earlier interpretation of § 1503 
to inform its reading of § 1512(b) in Thompson.99 “Corruptly,” then, applied to all 
acts “motivated by an improper purpose.”100 With this framework, the Thompson 
court depended on the illegality of the speech at issue to declare § 1512(b) 
constitutional. Instead of imposing an unacceptable blanket ban on all types of 
speech, “corruptly” confined the statute’s applicability to “constitutionally 
unprotected and purportedly illicit activity.”101 Recognizing that the Constitution 
does not protect illegal activity, this construction prevented § 1512(b) from being 
“overbroad.”102  
Thompson also challenged the statute on vagueness grounds. But “corruptly” 
as used within the statute was not found impermissibly vague either.103 Relative to 
“persuades,” “corruptly” acted as a “scienter,” modifying the conduct Congress 
intended to criminalize.104 That is, using the borrowed § 1503 interpretation for 
“corruptly,” “corruptly” modifies “persuades” with sufficient clarity so that its use 
in § 1512(b) describes prohibited conduct.105 The court in Thompson relied on the 
 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 445. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 452. 
98 Id.  
99 Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452; cf. United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 
1978) (discussing § 1503 and applying the “improper purpose” standard). The Second 
Circuit’s application may better incorporate Congressional intent for “corruptly persuades” 
in § 1512 to parallel intents similar to § 1503. See 134 CONG. REC. 13,780 (1988). 
100 Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452. 
101 Id. (quoting United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id.; see also Surette, supra note 29, at 3a (“[A] scienter requirement could suffice to 
provide adequate notice that given conduct was proscribed.”). 
105 Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). 
The court made particular mention to recognize the connection between § 1503’s and 
§ 1512(b)’s use of “corruptly” as meaning “motivated by an improper purpose.” Id. 
(referencing United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
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scienter to overcome the contention that “corruptly” is “unduly vague.”106 The 
statute puts the defendant on notice that “corruptly” modifies the act of persuasion, 
and that is sufficient for establishing a criminal standard.107 
Applying these principles, the court upheld Thompson’s § 1512(b) conviction. 
The challenged jury instruction defined “corruptly” as “act[ing] deliberately for the 
purpose of improperly influencing, or obstructing, or interfering with the 
administration of justice.”108 The court reasoned that this instruction articulated 
“corruptly” as an “improper purpose” well enough for the trial jury to apply against 
Thompson’s communication with the witness given the weight of the evidence.109 
 
B.  The Third Circuit Approach: United States v. Farrell 
 
William Farrell delivered meat byproduct to a processor in a meat adulterating 
conspiracy.110 Farrell contacted one of the processor’s employees during the federal 
investigation and asked the employee to withhold or falsify information told to 
investigators.111 Despite finding Farrell did not use coercive methods with the 
employee, the jury found Farrell guilty under § 1512(b)(3).112 Farrell appealed this 
conviction, arguing he did not “corruptly” persuade the employee witness under 
§ 1512(b).113 
The Farrell court noted the difficulty of defining “corruptly persuades” in 
§ 1512(b).114 The court first concluded the statute did not define which party 
“corruptly” applied to, because “corruptly” could describe changing either one’s 
own behavior or another’s behavior from “good to bad.”115 Legislative history 
suggested Congress intended to prohibit corrupt persuasion without defining what 
specific behavior was corrupt.116 The Farrell court then indicated the same problem 
the Supreme Court identified about corrupt conduct in Arthur Andersen LLP: a court 
should not punish persuasion that is not corrupt, and many ordinary situations 
produce persuasive conduct, but not corruptly persuasive conduct the statute 
intended to prevent.117 One example the Farrell court gave was the protection 
against self-incrimination since the employee Farrell attempted to persuade had a 
 
106 Id. In incorporating § 1503’s “improper purpose” language wholesale, the 
Thompson court fails to mention, or even acknowledge, the complexities in actually defining 
or using “corruptly” noted in other cases. See United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 488 n.2 
(3d Cir. 1997); see also discussion supra Section II.A.  
107 Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452. 
108 Id. at 453.  
109 Id. 
110 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 486. 
111 Id. at 487. 
112 Id. at 487–88. 
113 Id. at 487; see also Surette, supra note 29, at 2a. 
114 Id. at 487. 
115 Id. at 488, n.2. 
116 Farrell, 126 F.3d. at 488.  
117 Id. at 488–89. 
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valid Fifth Amendment interest.118 Because the employee could permissibly invoke 
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination without persuasion by Farrell, 
it would not be improper for Farrell to urge the employee to do so.119 
The Farrell court scrutinized “corruptly persuades” independent of other 
obstruction of justice statutes’ uses of “corruptly,” such as § 1503.120 The court then 
read “corruptly” in § 1512(b) as “implying that an individual can ‘persuade’ another 
not to disclose information . . . with the intent of hindering an investigation without 
violating the statute, i.e., without doing so ‘corruptly.’”121 The court gave two 
reasons for this distinction. First, the reading comports with the rule of lenity.122 As 
written, “corruptly persuades” could either use “corruptly” generally or apply only 
to persuasion, and resolving the ambiguity to favor the defendant supports the latter 
interpretation.123 Second, the court observed “corruptly” serves different purposes in 
§ 1503 and § 1512(b).124 Section 1503 criminalizes acts “corruptly . . . influenc[ing], 
obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the 
due administration of justice.”125 “Corruptly” acts as the mens rea for that statute.126 
Conversely, since § 1512(b) imposes a “knowing” mens rea on all of its provisions, 
“corruptly” only modifies “persuades” and therefore limits applicability to 
persuasion that is corrupt.127 In direct contrast to Thompson, the Farrell court 
believed that without this construction, “corruptly” becomes redundant.128 Under its 
reading, the Third Circuit concluded Farrell’s conduct was not corrupt persuasion 
under § 1512(b).129 
 
IV.  THE CIRCUITS’ APPROACHES COMPARED 
 
Many discussions of this circuit split contend that the Third Circuit articulates 
Arthur Andersen LLP’s holding better than the Second Circuit, and that the Second 
Circuit’s approach leaves great discretion in finding an “improper purpose” in 
alleged conduct.130 However, both circuits achieve the same goal in a § 1512(b) case: 
allowing prosecutions where corrupt intent exists and excusing innocent yet 
obstructive conduct. This outcome is true for two reasons that reconcile with Arthur 
 
118 Id. at 489; see also Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 164. 
119 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 488.  
120 Id. at 489 (noting the government desired that “corruptly persuades” apply to 
§ 1512(b) the same as in § 1503, that is, with “corruptly” amounting to any “improper 
purpose” as in the Second Circuit). 
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 490. 
125 18 U.S.C. § 1503. 
126 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 490. 
127 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). 
128 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 490. 
129 Id. 
130 See, e.g., Shrewsbury, supra note 6, at 401; Hasnas, supra note 73, at 190. 
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Andersen LLP, insofar as Circuit courts apply the same general concepts for 
“corruptly” across § 1512(b) prosecutions.131 First, both circuits correctly limit 
“corruptly” to acts performed for a wrongful, immoral purpose, not an innocent one. 
Second, using this limitation, both circuits exempt innocent persuasive acts from 
1512(b)’s scope, in accord with Arthur Andersen LLP’s holding. This Note will 
discuss both points below. 
 
A.  The Second and Third Circuits Recognize § 1512(b) Applies to Wrongful, 
Immoral Purposes 
 
Both circuits conform with the Arthur Andersen LLP connotations for 
“corruptly” as “wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil.”132 Recognizing wrongful 
conduct is imperative in criminal law. Through the mens rea requirement, criminal 
law purports “to insulate morally blameless conduct from the reach of federal 
criminal statutes by ensuring that offenders will not face conviction unless they had 
adequate notice that their conduct was legally or morally wrongful.”133 Conversely, 
showing “moral blameworthiness” in a defendant’s conduct is the foundation for 
just punishment.134  
In Farrell, the Third Circuit declined to define “corruptly,” instead focusing on 
how acts of persuasion could either be innocent or corrupt in practice and discussing 
to which acts § 1512(b) applies.135 The Court decided a definition was not needed 
because its interpretation recognized “the ‘culpable conduct’ that violates 
§ 1512(b)(3)’s ‘corruptly persuades’ clause does not include a noncoercive attempt 
to persuade a coconspirator” and its interpretation was therefore adequate.136 
However, the court mentioned in a footnote that “corruptly” could apply in either a 
verb or adjective form.137 The adjective form means “morally degenerate and 
perverted” and “characterized by improper conduct (as bribery or the selling of 
favors).”138 The verb form describes changing another’s conduct from “good to bad 
 
131 See Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 131–33 (noting the original purpose for 
“corruptly” was to denote morality-based offenses). 
132 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005). 
133 Smith, supra note 47, at 1614. 
134 Id. at 1613; see also Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 706 (“[L]imiting criminality 
to persuaders conscious of their wrongdoing sensibly allows § 1512(b) to reach only those 
with the level of ‘culpability . . . we usually require in order to impose criminal liability.’” 
(quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 602 (1995)). 
135 United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 488–89 (3d Cir. 1997). 
136 Id. at 488. 
137 Id. at n.2. 
138 Id. (quoting Corrupt, WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 294 
(1985)). The Merriam Webster’s dictionary definition the Third Circuit cited aligns 
“corruptly” with the older common law definition for corrupt as conduct “against morals,” 
which was directed towards the bribery context. However, modern definitions of corrupt 
encompass both the earlier morality-based definition as well as the more worldly and 
straightforward idea of illegal or unlawful conduct that distinguished its first uses. 
Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 133. 
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in morals, manners, or actions” and “to become [oneself] morally debased.”139 This 
latter description encompasses corruption on the part of two parties: the defendant 
attempting the witness tampering, and the targeted witness herself. 
The Farrell court then suggested that the word “corruptly” implied that the 
defendant must have a corrupt purpose citing a definition from the Webster’s 
Dictionary, or that “some ‘morally debased’ purpose” was necessary in the 
§ 1512(b) witness tampering context.140 These notions are intended to limit 
§ 1512(b) to conduct that has some form of corrupt influence,141 using the same 
reasoning later adopted in Arthur Andersen LLP.142 In particular, both the Second 
Circuit and Third Circuit directly connected “corruptly” to recognizably “bad”143 
and “evil”144 conduct. These synonyms perform the work of constraining conduct 
absent a formal definition for “corruptly.” Section 1512(b) can only apply if the 
defendant had a recognizably wicked purpose for persuading a witness not to testify 
or cooperate with an investigation. 
In Thompson, the Second Circuit included little discussion of connotations for 
“corrupt” beyond “improper purpose” and the jury instruction.145 As an earlier 
Second Circuit case explained, “‘corruptly’ is capable of different meanings in 
different connections.”146 Earlier Second Circuit opinions use language such as 
“influence, intimidate, or impede” to apply “corruptly,” which without additional 
clarification comes dangerously close to rejected Supreme Court connotations.147 
 
139 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 488, n.2. 
140 Id. 
141 See Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 163–64. 
142 Hasnas, supra note 73, at 191. 
143 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 488–89. 
144 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005). The Ninth Circuit 
also applies Arthur Andersen LLP’s discussion of “corruptly” this way in its jurisprudence, 
even though jury instructions do not expressly need to include the connotations when 
defining “corruptly.” United States v. Watters, 717 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 2013).  
145 United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 453 (2d Cir. 1996). See the discussion 
supra Section III.A for more analysis of the Second Circuit’s review of the jury instructions. 
The Thompson opinion includes an excerpt of the jury instructions for the obstruction of 
justice charge. The instruction reads in whole at the pertinent part, “To act ‘corruptly[’] as 
that word is used in these instructions means to act deliberately for the purpose of improperly 
influencing, or obstructing, or interfering with the administration of justice.” Id. The 
remainder of the instructions cited lay out the elements of the obstruction of justice charge. 
Id. Like the more concise “improper purpose” phrasing from the Second Circuit’s review, 
the instruction bestows wide potential to determine if the defendant’s actions satisfy 
“corruptly persuades” in § 1512(b). Id.; see also United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 343 
(2d Cir. 2006). 
146 Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1917). This 1917 holding more 
accurately captures the difficulties applying “corruptly” consistently in differing situations 
that Thompson omits. See also Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 131–32. 
147 Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452 (noting the prior holding in United States v. Fasolino, 586 
F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1978)); cf. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 703–04, 707 (Noting 
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This application would allow for trial courts to prosecute any “improper” act that 
has an obstructive effect, not just acts performed with a wicked intent, precisely what 
the Supreme Court later rejected in Arthur Andersen LLP148 and the Third Circuit 
excluded in Farrell.149 
However, the court in Thompson also noted that the Constitution does not 
protect “illegal” acts, thereby indirectly connecting “corruptly” in § 1512(b) to 
wrongful conduct and wrongful purposes.150 Illegal acts differ from innocent acts in 
the “moral blameworthiness” of the actor.151 The commission of an illegal act alone 
is not sufficient for establishing criminal liability, because “it is also necessary to 
ask whether the offender’s act was sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the penalties 
authorized by Congress.”152 An awareness of the wrongful nature of a 
communication, rather than the mere fact that a communication occurred, is what 
creates criminal liability.153 Statutory mens rea requirements apply to understanding 
the illegal nature of a communication.154 Applying these determinations to 
§ 1512(b), “corruptly” ensured “illegal” purposes are not exempt from § 1512(b)’s 
scope, and approach the acceptable “wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil” 
articulations for “corruptly” from Arthur Andersen LLP.155 These connotations 
move “corruptly” away from the rejected connotations of “subvert, undermine, or 
impede.”156 Reading “corruptly” with the connotations discussed frame its use 
properly, as an improper state of mind necessary for establishing mens rea, instead 
of a modifier on the act of persuasion. 
The foundation for both circuits’ interpretations of “corruptly” on a conceptual 
level underscores how § 1512(b) prosecutions proceed towards a similar result: 
advancing cases against defendants with corrupt purposes motivating their 
persuasive acts. Without this similar understanding, especially under the Arthur 
Andersen LLP articulation for “corruptly,” the current circuit split would have 
greater consequences than this Note argues. This divergence in interpretation has 
been the primary thrust of prior analyses on this circuit split.157 
However, comments from both circuits align their understanding of “corruptly” 
towards acts performed for recognizably evil and immoral purposes. Language from 
the Farrell and Thompson opinions compared to Arthur Andersen LLP underscores 
this point. The Third Circuit in Farrell described “corruptly” as “morally degenerate 
 
that withholding testimony or documents from Government proceedings or officials “is not 
inherently malign” and that the term “impede” need “not incorporate any ‘corrupt[ness]’ at 
all”). 
148 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 703–04. 
149 United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 488–89 (3d Cir. 1997). 
150 Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452. 
151 Smith, supra note 47, at 1619. 
152 Id.  
153 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015).  
154 Id.  
155 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005). 
156 Id. at 706. 
157 See, e.g., Shrewsbury, supra note 6, at 376.  
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and perverted.”158 While the Second Circuit in Thompson only described “corruptly” 
in terms of illegal actions, it expounded on “corruptly” in its later opinions to mean 
“debased in character; infected with evil; depraved.”159 These descriptors focus on 
the defendant’s state of mind during the persuasive act, which must be an immoral 
one. Both circuits recognize that a defendant’s underlying immoral purpose 
motivating her persuasion is required to prosecute for “corruptly persuading” under 
§ 1512(b), and therefore assess “corruptly” from a similar understanding. 
 
B.  Both Circuits Exempt Innocent Persuasive Actions from § 1512(b) Prosecution 
 
The “improper purpose” and “knowledge of corrupt purpose” standards both 
account for and excuse persuasion that is not corrupt, as required by Arthur Andersen 
LLP.160 The Supreme Court construed § 1512(b) to limit its applicability to wrongful 
purposes a defendant would know of in persuading, or attempting to persuade, a 
witness to some course of action in an effort to obstruct a federal proceeding.161 The 
Court used this two-step review of a defendant’s purpose because “knowingly” 
requires awareness or understanding and “corruptly” connotes wrong or evil.162 
Therefore, a person must understand he undertakes a persuasive act and knows of 
its wrongfulness to fall under § 1512(b).163 The illegal nature of a defendant’s act is 
“the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct” producing 
criminal liability.164 Also, if “corruptly” encompassed prosecuting innocent activity, 
the statutorily granted defense in § 1512(e) would fail in the Second Circuit.165 
Therefore, any construction of § 1512(b) must protect innocent persuasion and 
persuasion for any reason other than a corrupt motive. 
In Farrell, the Third Circuit analyzed § 1512(b) along parallel lines to the 
Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen LLP. The Third Circuit imposed two culpability 
standards on defendants because “corruptly” only modifies “persuade,” and 
“knowing” modifies both words.166 The Supreme Court and the Third Circuit chose 
to clearly state that innocent or non-corrupt purposes for persuasion were not 
performed “corruptly,” based on statutory interpretation grounds.167 The Third 
Circuit determined that if “corruptly” applied strictly using the Second Circuit’s 
acceptance of the § 1503 definition, then “corruptly” would have no effective 
 
158 United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 488 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). 
159 United States v. Veliz, 800 F.3d 63, n.6 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing 3 THE OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 972 (2d ed. 1989)). 
160 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 703–04. 
161 Id. at 705–06. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 706; see also Hasnas, supra note 73, at 191. 
164 Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015) (internal quotation omitted). 
165 See Decker, supra note 21, at 72. 
166 United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 489–90 (3d Cir. 1997). 
167 Hasnas, supra note 73, at 190–91. 
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meaning.168 Thus according to the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the Second 
Circuit’s reasoning, the statute would read as “intending to bring about an improper 
result such as the obstruction of justice.”169 This reading would include actions that 
obstruct justice without the requisite improper intent to obstruct justice.170 Statutory 
interpretation is one reason the Third Circuit majority rejected the Second Circuit’s 
“improper purpose” formulation for § 1512(b) in Farrell.171 From this logic, the 
Third Circuit surmised that innocent purposes, such as informing a witness of his 
legitimate Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, would disappear 
without a narrower application of “corruptly.”172 Innocent purposes are excluded 
from § 1512(b)’s scope under Arthur Andersen LLP as well;173 including them at 
this point would defy that precedent. 
In the Second Circuit, acts done for an “improper purpose,” are also done 
“corruptly” for reasons that reconcile with Arthur Andersen LLP. Borrowing 
“improper purpose” from § 1503,174 the Second Circuit utilizes the term as a 
“specific intent to impede the administration of justice”175 for § 1512(b). This 
application of “corruptly” would limit the section to cases where the defendant 
intends to obstruct justice, instead of cases where obstruction occurs merely as a 
consequence of an action taken for another purpose. Furthermore, a defendant in a 
Second Circuit § 1512(b) prosecution must understand she had an “improper 
purpose” in the act of persuasion.176 In the line of cases examining the corrupt 
persuasion of federal officers and judges (prohibited under § 1512(b)(3)), the 
Second Circuit has stated, “[t]his provision ‘requires a specific intent to interfere 
with the communication of information.’”177 
Following these guidelines, persuasion for any other purpose, such as 
encouraging a person to use their Fifth Amendment right against self-
 
168 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 490; Jeffrey W. DeBeer, Corruptly Persuading Privilege: The 
Effect of United States v. Doss on the Marital Privilege, The Fifth Amendment, and Federal 
Witness Tampering Statute § 1512(B), 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 591, 598 (2011). 
169 DeBeer, supra note 168, at 598. 
170 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 488. 
171 Id. at 490; DeBeer, supra note 168, at 598. But see Farrell, 126 F.3d at 491–94 
(Campbell, J., dissenting). 
172 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 489–90. 
173 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705–07 (2005). The Ninth 
Circuit also stated that “‘knowingly corruptly’ [in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)] requires 
‘consciousness of wrongdoing.’” United States v. Watters, 717 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 706); see also United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 
1181, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting Arthur Andersen “offers some guidance” as the Court 
considered the “two competing approaches”). 
174 United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996). 
175 United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1236, (2d Cir. 1983); see 
Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 152. 
176 Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452 (noting the court’s prior holding relative to § 1503 in 
United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
177 United States v. McLaurin, 767 F. App’x 186, 187 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United 
States v. Genao, 343 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
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incrimination178 or to follow office policy,179 is not prosecutable because the would-
be defendant is not “knowingly” acting with an “improper purpose” to obstruct. 
These purposes do not track with the explanation or connotations for what courts 
recognize as improper or corrupt.180 The “improper purpose” standard only applies 
when the would-be defendant has a purpose that a jury (or an appellate court on 
review) finds improper after an inquiry into the facts.181 Compare persuasion with 
the intent to inform a person of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
to persuasion with the intent to hide one’s guilt. Evidence could establish either 
motive case by case, as the trier of fact determines which motive the evidence 
proves. “Corruptly” and “knowingly” act as a limitation on persuasive acts to ensure 
that § 1512(b) does not become “overbroad.”182 
Current commentary on the circuit split insists “improper purpose” applies 
“corruptly” too broadly because any purpose that obstructs a proceeding is 
considered corrupt.183 The “improper purpose” formulation in Thompson seems to 
contradict the Third Circuit and Arthur Andersen LLP because it gave no recognition 
to cases where other reasons for persuasion may excuse conduct from criminal 
liability.184 The “improper purpose” framing collapses the distinction between how 
“corruptly” can apply to both a defendant obtaining an improper benefit for himself 
and any action that interferes with the administration of justice.185 The distinction is 
the precise reason some other circuits considering a § 1512(b) case in their 
jurisdictions have rejected the “improper purpose” standard.186 But this argument 
identifies a risk with the Second Circuit approach, rather than a fatal defect. 
While it is true the Second Circuit does not note the distinction in Thompson, 
the court analyzes a defendant’s alleged “improper purpose” case by case. If the trier 
of fact determines that the defendant’s purpose for persuasion is not improper, then 
 
178 But see United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 343 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding an improper 
purpose when evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant’s purpose was to prevent 
testimony that implicated the defendant). 
179 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 700, 704 (2005). 
180 Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452. 
181 Id. at 453; see also United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 493 n.1 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(Campbell, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, ‘improper purpose’ may not always be self-defining, 
and may require further analysis in some situations.”). 
182 Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452.  
183 Shrewsbury, supra note 6, at 389. 
184 Id. at 391. The evolution of the Second Circuit’s language in more recent years has 
made this distinction clearer than in Thompson. See United States v. McLaurin, 767 F. App’x 
186, 187 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Genao, 343 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2003)) 
(recognizing “corruptly” requires a “specific intent”). 
185 See Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 148–49 (mentioning an example of how one 
definition of “corruptly” can be separated into two distinct parts for more consistent 
application). 
186 United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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§ 1512(b) cannot apply.187 The defendant’s “improper purpose” must stem from a 
wrongful intent.188 Determining if the defendant had an “improper purpose” also 
remains a jury question, as the jury must decide if the prosecution has shown an 
“improper purpose,”189 considering the defendant’s intent from all of the presented 
evidence.190 And in many obstruction of justice prosecutions, the alleged conduct 
will often conform to an understandable violation of § 1512(b), so that a more 
precise definition would not change a trial’s outcome.191 It is the margin cases, such 
as advising a potential witness of their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, that a precise definition of “corruptly” proves most useful. But a jury 
decides these cases based on presented evidence. Appellate review considers the 
alleged conduct in light of appropriate connotations for “corruptly.”192 Therefore, 
the case-by-case application of the Second Circuit’s interpretation of “corruptly” in 
§ 1512(b) yields similar practical outcomes as the Third Circuit’s interpretation and 
is compatible with the precedent set in Arthur Andersen LLP. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
As Mueller’s overview of § 1512(b) noted, the United States federal court 
system faces a difficult challenge using “corruptly” in “corruptly persuades.”193 The 
importance of this problem is reflected in just how much conduct could obstruct 
justice when a case is ongoing. In the cases examined above, prosecutors challenged 
persuading a coconspirator to lie about a defendant’s involvement in a crime,194 
asking a fellow employee to falsify testimony,195 and shredding potentially 
incriminating documents according to office policy.196 Too low of a standard for 
corruptly leaves innocent acts open to prosecution under § 1512(b). Too high of a 
 
187 United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 343 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Farrell, 
126 F.3d 484, 493, n.1 (3d Cir. 1997) (Campbell, J., dissenting). The Second Circuit later 
clarified how “corruptly” should be read under Arthur Andersen LLP. United States v. Veliz, 
800 F.3d 63, n.6 (2d Cir. 2015) (restating that “corruptly” in § 1512(b) “where the . . . 
persuasion . . . is by itself innocuous” means that § 1512(b) can only apply to “persuaders 
conscious of their wrongdoing” (quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 
696, 706 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  
188 See United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996). 
189 Id.; see also United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1236, (2d Cir. 1983) 
(“Intent to obstruct justice is normally something that a jury may infer from all of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances.”). 
190 See Farrell, 126 F.3d at 490. 
191 Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 150. 
192 Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1236; see discussion supra Section IV.A–B.  
193 See Shrewsbury, supra note 6, at 375; MUELLER REPORT, supra note 1 at *14 
(discussing how Mueller described a standard for “corruptly” in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)). 
194 United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1996). 
195 United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 487 (3d Cir. 1997). 
196 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 699–702 (2005). 
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standard gives little deterrence for tampering with potential witnesses in ways 
§ 1512(b) was adopted to prevent.197 
Despite confusing interpretations, this Note has shown that the practical effect 
of this split over §1512(b) is less significant than the circuits’ different phrasing 
suggests. The conceptual understandings of “corruptly” are comparable across 
circuits, and the “improper purpose” must be recognizable as corrupt within this 
understanding. Though the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1512(b) more 
closely resembles the Third Circuit’s, the Second Circuit’s foundation in Thompson 
and later developments in its caselaw recognize that only a wrongdoer’s conscious 
consideration of her immoral, illegal actions will place her at risk for prosecution. 
Only wrongful acts done for wrongful purposes satisfy “corruptly” under the 
statute.198 
But the very fact a circuit split has endured for so long, even after a Supreme 
Court opinion on the statute, implies that some effort should be made to resolve the 
different circuits’ applications of “corruptly” through legislation. Congress should 
enact a consistent definition of “corruptly” in § 1512(b) to avoid further confusion 
and give a clear standard for “corruptly” to prosecutors, witnesses, and judges.199 A 
clearer statutory definition or standard for “corruptly persuades” may not resolve all 
difficulties in interpretation that have arisen since § 1512(b)’s 1988 amendments. 
Instead, such language would signal innocent reasons for persuasion are explicitly 
excluded from § 1512 (b) prosecutions in all circuits. Clearer language need not 
enumerate all ways potential defendants might corruptly persuade, as such precision 
is likely impossible.200 Out of the two types of formulations discussed in this Note, 
adopting the Third Circuit or Arthur Andersen LLP language201 would establish that 
“corruptly” for 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) means only a truly wrongful purpose. 
 
197 134 Cong. Rec. S 7446–01, 7447 (daily ed. June 8, 1988). 
198 See United States v. Veliz, 800 F.3d 63, n.6 (2d Cir. 2015). 
199 See Shrewsbury, supra note 6, at 376 (explaining the benefits of a clear standard for 
“corruptly persuades” in the context of § 1512(b)). Again, it is worth considering the 
counterexample of a uniform application of “corruptly” for prosecutions under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7212(a). The uniform definition given resolves any ambiguities on how all parties should 
apply “corruptly” to each new case’s facts. See Tamashasky, supra note 19, at 148–49.  
200 Farrell, 126 F.3d at 493, n.1 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
201 The Supreme Court chose a construction of “corruptly persuades” that more closely 
resembles the Third Circuit’s in Arthur Andersen LLP. The Court did so to explicitly 
recognize that some acts of persuasion are not corrupt. Hasnas, supra note 73, at 190. 
